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Block: The Use of Behavioral Research in Products Liability Litigation

THE USE OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
One commentator,' in assessing Justice Traynor's "impressive performance" in decisions spanning two decades, 2 cites as his
particular contribution, the articulation of a distinct liability
theory for consumers as opposed to injured parties in general.
This issue of the Hofstra Law Review bears testimony to that
contribution. The developing case law in products liability has
been increasingly shifting its focus to the expectations of consumers and away from the customs of the trade. It is this development
which has suggested the theme of this comment. What is proposed here is an extension of what is already accepted in products
liability case law; namely, that eminently foreseeable human
behavior may determine the reasonable use of a product and thus
define the manufacturer's responsibility. The determination of
what is foreseeable however, is typically based on an unselfconscious reliance on conventional wisdom. Although this would seem
to have been adequate in many cases, such a method of acquiring
knowledge about human behavior becomes increasingly unreliable as products and the behaviors which they call forth become
more complex. Thus, this comment will suggest: (1) How a more
sophisticated appreciation of the methods and techniques which
have been developed in the behavioral sciences can be applied to
tighten the theoretical definition of defectiveness and (2) how
knowledge obtained through these methods could be applied in
the courts to increase the reliability of the decision making process in specific disputes and to develop general guidelines for the
future.

I.

THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL FRAMEWORK

The factor which seems to distinguish consumers from other
tort victims in Justice Traynor's decisions is the lack of capacity
of the injured party to protect himself from harm. 3 In the Traynor
view, strict liability in tort is called for in product cases because
the consumer has no way of detecting defects in the goods he
buys. Kalven, seeing "the germ of a large idea here,"4 explains:
1. Kalven, Torts: The Quest for AppropriateStandards,53 CALmi. L. REv. 189 (1965).
2. The milestones referred to are: Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 24 Cal. 2d 453,
150 P. 2d 436 (1944) (concurring opinion); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
3. Cf. Neel v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal. 2d 647, 122 P.2d 576 (1942).
4. Kalven, supra note 1, at 206.
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"Perhaps negligence is suited only for cases where there is some
parity of risk avoiding ability between actor and victim, where,
so to speak, risk avoidance is shared between them." 5 The "germ"
referred to by Kalven has not yet reached full fruition in terms
of realigning the equities between producers and consumers.
Strict products liability' has not disarmed the defenders of the
unfettered market place.' It has simply forced a change in their
tactics.8 Where once the main barrier in a products liability case
was developing enough proof of actual negligencelto reach the
jury,"' current emphasis in such a case will be on defectiveness
5. Id.
6. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
7. See generally C. GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AurOMOBILE INDUSTRY 206
(1960):
[M]odern products-liability law. . . has gone far in bringing about that shifting of risks in sales transactions called for by the conditions of modem industrial
society. Yet it cannot be emphasized too strongly that this risk-shifting process,
however natural and desirable it may seem to the mid-twentieth-century
student of jurisprudence, is bottomed upon and limited by two fundamental
conceptions: the idea that products liability follows only from a 'defect' in the
goods purchased, and the idea that even if a 'defect' is proved, liability results
only if the 'defect' is the 'proximate cause' of the plaintiff's injury. Goods do
not have to be 'defective' to be dangerous, and the idea of proximateness is a
quite significant qualification of the idea of causation. Even the modern law is
capable of dealing only with the direct results of ultimate facts, and in practice
this means that our society still accepts the principle of caveat emptor as an
appropriate justification for the results of a large class of cases.
8. Of primary importance is the fact that contributory negligence is not a defense to
an action in strict liability. But cf. James, Assumption of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation,
78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968); Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, 60 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1974)
suggesting that on the basis of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) "the defense now
may be an amalgam of assumption of the risk and contributory negligence."
9. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) established
the principle that the defendant's liability is based upon a general duty to use reasonable
care to avoid injury to those to whom danger from defects in manufacture is reasonably
foreseeable, "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and
limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger." 217 N.Y. at 389, 111
N.E. at 1053.
10. See, e.g.,
C. GILLAM, supra note 7, at 49:
Today the consumer's problem in a tort action against a manufacturer is
not so much to show that the goods are dangerous if negligently made as to prove
that the manufacturer actually was negligent. The manufacturer's tort liability
turns upon his due care or lack of it; he is negligent only if he fails to use
reasonable care under the circumstances. What conduct is required by the standard of due care is a difficult question of fact.
But cf. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1114-1115 (1960). In the context of a discussion as to why plaintiffs want strict
liability and why defendants are "equally vociferous" in their opposition to it, Dean
Prosser says, ". . . there is not one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result
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and proximate cause."
These issues take on a particular significance in litigation
involving defective design of a product as opposed to material
defectiveness. Obviously, an alleged defect in design' 2 brings into
sharp focus the question of the intended purpose of the product.
Such a product might be completely defect free for one purpose
and just as completely unsuitable and defective for another. In
other words, defect cannot be defined in the abstract 3 without
regard for the human being who will form the other part of the
use equation.' 4 Thus, a product might serve a purely esthetic
function for the consumer and have a useful function or functions,
as well. It might have a primary use function as well as a secondin recovery where negligence does not. . . . once the cause of the injury is proved to lie
with the defendant, once it is brought home to his plant, the jury finds for the plaintiff."
11. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile Industry: Much Ado
About Nothing, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 83, 114 says in the context of automobile products
liability, "regardless of the liability theory advanced, determination of the evidence
needed to get to the jury on the issues of defectiveness and causation is probably the most
pressing contemporary issue . . . ." Of the 34 personal injury cases litigated on a negligence theory which he examined, 12 were decided for the manufacturer because of insufficient proof of a defect or causation, as compared with only 3 for a failure to prove negligence. Id. at 113. Nevertheless, the legal advisors to the three major domestic automobile
manufacturers "uniformly were of the view that their principal problem today is the
liberality with which courts are defining the quantity of proof needed to get to the jury
on the issues of defect and causation . . . . Chrysler's lawyers stated that [even
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), a landmark
products case which relied upon a breach of implied warranty as the basis of recovery]
was appealed primarily on the sufficiency of the evidence issue rather than on the technical defenses to warranty recovery discussed by the New Jersey court." Id. at 118.
12. See, e.g., Davlin v. Henry Ford & Son, 20 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1927); Reusch v. Ford
Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495 (8th Cir. 1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965); 2 HARPER & JAMES,
ToRs §§ 28.3-28.4 (1956) on extending manufacturer's duty to use due care to the design
and specifications of his product. But see C. Gillam, suprd'note 7 at 104:
-[T]he words used to create an idea may also confine it. This is what has
happened in a number of the design cases, where the word 'defective' has tended
to become a word of limitation rather than a word of grant. The wheel in
MacPherson. . . was a rotten, atypical, substandard wooden-spoked wheel; the
manufacturer fell below the standard he had established for himself, and had
to pay for the resulting injury. The wheel simply did not meet a predetermined
standard of quality. In this sense it was defective, and under the circumstances
dangerously so. But a product which actually does meet the predetermined
standards of quality established by its manufacturer is not defective in this
sense . . . . [Tihe law may have the effect of placing a premium upon the
adoption of low standards of quality.
13. Cf. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 437 (1972) in which the court stated: "The design and manufacture of products
should not be carried out in an industrial vacuum but with recognition of the realities of
their everyday use."
14. The field known as "human factors engineering", or "human engineering" or
"engineering psychology", as the various names imply, deals with the attempt to design
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ary (or even tertiary) functional value for the user.'" To use a
simple example, a chair designed to be a reproduction of one used
by a primitive society and which will be encased behind glass in
a museum might be completely defect free regardless of its stability; if its function were to provide seating, a considerable degree
of stability would be required; if it were to be used as a step-stool
the requisite stability would be even greater.
Indeed, this principle has been recognized and only the first
part of the given example is fictitious (to the author's knowledge).
In Garbutt v. Schechter'" the plaintiff, a rather heavy woman,
was injured when the chair she attempted to sit on tipped and
she fell to the floor. The jury was permitted to find that the design
of the chair created an unreasonable risk, since it was "of the type
of new fangled creations that are called modern, and which are
designed more to please the eye than to provide the stability one
expects to find when reposing the anatomy upon a chair in a place
of business.' 7 Recovery was allowed in Phillips v. Ogle
Aluminum FurnitureInc.,'" when a woman was injured as a result
of standing on a chair which was designed in such a way that it
would tip forward when weight was placed near the front. It was
held that a jury could find that it is to be anticipated that people
sometimes stand on chairs.
Both of these decisions were based on the implicit assumption that the manner in which a human being will use a given
product is predictable and as such is determinative of the characteristics which will be demanded of the product.'" The behaviors
involved however-sitting and standing-are perhaps among the
least complex activities people engage in, in terms of both the
physical and mental processes involved. The fact that people will
man-machine-environment systems to fit the capabilities and limitations of the people
who will use them.
15. Cf. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86111. App. 2d 315, 329, 229 N.E,2d
684, 691 (1967):
It may be noted that a hammer is an implement of beguiling simplicity,
and there is probably no artifact with so many uses, real or fancied . . . . A
hammer is a hammer to most people and limitations in the implement, or its
age, fitness and condition, are not apparent to the unsophisticated. It should
be reasonably safe for the purposes for which it is intended and for other uses
which are foreseeably probable.
16. 167 Cal. App. 2d 396, 334 P.2d 225 (1959).
17. Id. at 399, 334 P.2d at 227.
18. 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 235 P.2d 857, 859-60 (1951).
19. In fact every decision in a product case which holds the defendant liable on the
basis that the use (or misuse) of the product was or should have been foreseen is based
on this assumption.
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use chairs for sitting and occasionally even to stand upon is
clearly of such common knowledge that it is well within the area
of factual material of which the courts have traditionally taken
judicial notice. 2 Obviously, no sophisticated research or system
of data collection is required, nor expert testimony to elucidate
upon it. As the interaction between the consumer and the product
becomes more complex, it becomes increasingly difficult and unto aid in prediction.
reliable to use such conventional wisdom
2
In 1950, James and Dickinson said: '
Tort law is obviously much concerned with human conduct that
produces accidents. For the past thirty years men working in
fields such as industrial psychology have been making studies
and finding things out about this conduct. To date no one has
tried to point out in any systematic and detailed way what
implications these studies and findings may have for tort law in
accident cases.
The James and Dickinson article focused on the then popular
concept of accident proneness and how this related to the viability of retaining the concept of fault as a basis for civil liability. It
has been termed as a "bellwether"2 2 in that its analysis was illustrative of the flexibility tort law has in being able to respond to
''social issues posed by the life sciences . . . [and] the rapidly
23 It
growing body of knowledge about the human psyche.
stressed the vital importance of the human factor in the area of
accident control, that "[i]t is not the machine which should be
regarded as hazardous so much as the individual who is operating
that machine. ' 24 Based on an extensive review of the psychological literature dealing with such factors as sensory-motor skills,
20. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence and Assump-

tion of Risk, 25 VANM. L. REv. 93, 96 (1972), citing 2 F. HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 28.6, at 1546 (1956): "So it has been said that 'automobiles will surely be driven,

sometimes at high speed, and often where other vehicles and pedestrians are present'; and
that hair dye 'will be applied to hair and will touch the skin; cosmetics will be applied to
faces; underclothes will be worn next to the skin; tractors will get mired; food will be eaten
21. James and Dickinson, Accident Pronenessand Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv.
769 (1950).
22. Shapo, Changing Frontiersin Torts: Vistas for the 70's, 22 STAN. L. REV. 330, 331
(1970).
23. Id. at 335.
24. James and Dickinson, supra note 21, at 770, n.10, state that: "[O]nly 3.5 per
cent of all cars involved in accidents have been shown to have mechanical defects and in
only . . . [less than one per cent] of cars involved in accidents can it be shown that the
defect played a part in causing the accident."; citing Canning, Motor Vehicle Inspection
Records Show That Mechanical Defects Play Small Part in Highway Accidents, 74
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coordination, perception, reaction time, 2' the conclusion was
reached that: "The standard for contributory negligence . . .
should be subjective and take the victim's accident proneness
both
into account, for a subjective standard for plaintiffs would
2'6
refine the fault principle and compensate more victims.
The concept of accident proneness grew up in an early period
in the development of psychology and was based heavily on clinical impressions that there were some people who almost appeared
to be asking for accidents to happen to them. This was related
by analytically oriented psychologists to such things as suicide
tendency and the need for self-punishment. There is indeed evidence that some people are involved in a disproportionate number of accidents. Their number in the general population, however, account for but a very small percentage of all accidents.2
Although such people should undoubtedly be identified and given
this would not begin to resolve the probsome special treatment,
28
accidents.
of
lem
AU'rOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 336 (1936); also citing Cardall,PsychologicalFactors in Accident
Prevention, 26 PERSONNEL J. 288 (1948); T. FORBES, HUMAN FACTORS IN HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY RESEARCH 3 (1972) says: "It has been clear almost from the first studies that errors,
lapses, and limitations of automobile drivers were involved in 75 to 90 per cent. . . of
mishaps." D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHWAY
CRASHES 63 (1970), although rejecting what they see as the underlying assumption of
traffic accident reporting-that "every individual is omniscient, omnipotent, and totally
rational, and that he becomes culpably involved in crashes through intentional lapses
from this state of omniscience, omnipotence and rationality"-cite the National Safety
Council's Accident Facts (1968) which reports that " 'improper driving' was involved in
. . . 91% of all crashes."
25. James and Dickinson, supra note 21, at 773 n. 18 (1950), citing Johnson,
Detection and Treatment of Accident-ProneDrivers, 43 PSYCH. BULL. 489 (1946) and Miles
and Vincent, The Institute's Test for Motor Drivers, 8 HUMAN FACTOR 245 (1934) for the
fact that: "[ihere are psychophysical tests for reaction time, resistance to distraction,
vigilance, visual co-ordination, vision, judgment of relative size of near and distant objects, judgment of speeds." James and Dickinson also refer to a study by Drake, Accident

Proneness:A Hypothesis, 8

CHARACTER AND PERSONALITY

335, 339-46 (1939), in which the

author came to the conclusion that, "the person who reacts quicker than he can perceive
is more likely to have accidents than the person who can perceive quicker than he can
react." Id. at 773 and n.22.
26. James & Dickinson, supra note 21 at 795.
27. Cf. T. FORBES, HUMAN FACTORS IN HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH 3 (1972):
[O]ne of the early theories was that a few "accident-prone" drivers caused
most of the trouble, and that if these could be found and eliminated, most of
the highway safety problem could be solved. Unfortunately this has not proved
to be the case.
28. Cf. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, CAUSATION, CULPBABILITY AND DETERRENCE IN HIGHwAY
CRASHES 71 n.6
REPEATER (1970)

(1970), citing for support, J.
in stating:

FERREIRA, ACCIDENTS AND THE ACCIDENT

It is commonly believed that a small fraction of the driving population is
responsible for a large proportion of all crashes and that the removal of this
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The contribution psychological research can make in this
area is not in identiflying the accident prone individual per se,
but rather by isolating the sources of human error, it can contribute to identifying the defect in the man-machine system which
could be averted through better design. The significance of the
James and Dickinson article was not so much its specific focus
or even its conclusion, as it was the recognition that the methods
and techniques of behavioral science research could be useful in
determining which events were foreseeable and in thus narrowing
the issue of duty and proximate cause in litigation involving accidents. 21 Since tort law, before the age of mass production, always
dealt with unique sets of circumstances and parties, research
dealing with the behavior of groups would not have been useful.
Thus, logic was the only tool available to the court to determinewhether the Long Island Railroad Company should have foreseen
that a man carrying a package of explosives would drop them
while he was being assisted in boarding a train by a servant of
the company and that the resulting explosion would topple some
scales at the other end of the platform where a potentially famous
tort victim happened to be standing waiting for the train going
3
in the other direction. 0
small fraction (by license revocation or other means) would substantially reduce
the total number of crashes. Careful statistical work over long periods of time
. . . totally disproves this notion.
29. Comment, 42 NOTRE DZ1E LAWYER 111, 113 (1966) suggests that breach of duty
and causation are relatively easy to prove in defective manufacture cases, whereas proof
of these elements is far less accessible when the allegation is one of defective design. Noel,
Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design or Directionsfor Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816
(1962) is cited as suggesting that "this difficulty stems from a reluctance on the part of
judges to allow juries composed of laymen to decide whether there has been a breach of
duty in the design of a product which was prepared by experts." As this article will
attempt to show, juries can and should be allowed to evaluate the evidence of expert
behavioral scientists to determine not whether the product in question was adequately
designed or engineered per se but whether knowledge about the users of the product was
adequately considered by the engineers or design experts responsible for the ultimate
product.
30. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Cf. Steele v.
Rapp, 183 Kans. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) in which the issue was also framed in terms of
proximate cause; whether the carelessness of an employee was "an independent efficient
intervening cause" of plaintiff's injury or whether the "intervening cause might reasonably
have been anticipated" by the defendant. The case is of particular interest to this discussion however, because it dealt with the behavior of the plaintiff as "the independent
force". The plaintiff had dropped a bottle containing "highly inflammable and explosive"
fluid. The defendant was held liable, as Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion:
"If there should have been reasonable foresight of the. . . resulting injury or of injury of
some kind, then defendant's force remained the proximate cause of the injury." Id. at 394,
327 P.2d at 1071. The dissent on the other hand, made much of the fact that plaintiffs
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In the area of products liability however, we are no longer
dealing with such unique situations. The class of potential plaintiffs is relatively similarly situated and the defendant has typically put on the market a vast number of similar if not identical
products. As the variables become more standardized, the question of the forseeability (i.e., the predictability) of an event becomes a proper one for scientific as opposed to purely logical
examination. Whether people stand on chairs,3' whether they use
hammers "not only for carpentry work, but for driving steel pins,
metal drills, metal shafts and posts. . . and for work upon machinery .... -32 whether as a result of boredom they cease to attend3
to obvious dangers and put their hands in punch presses,
whether they drive cars when they are not capable of doing so
because either temporary emotional stress or intake of alcohol, for
3
example, has interfered with their judgment and performance '
are all questions which are particularly suitable to the scientific
method of inquiry. The fact that the methodology is available to
predict with accuracy how people will behave in relation to a
given product-not how a given individual will behave, but how
in terms of probabilities, a defined class (whether driver, tractor
operator, punch press operator) will behave-establishes a duty
on the manufacturer of a product to put this knowledge to use in
its design.
It is the thrust of this article that the failure of a manufacturer to take into consideration, in the design of a product, the
known or knowable propensities of the person who will use or
operate the product, should create a presumption that the prodwere experienced in their trade and knew the dangerous character of the product therefore
entitling the defendant to assume that the product would be handled with caution.
31. Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857
(1951).
32. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 330, 229 N.E.2d
684, 691 (1967).
33. Cf. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); Finnegan v.
Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972).
34. Cf. Hughey v. Lennox, 142 Ark. 593, 219 S.W. 323 (1920) in which the court held,
"[a]n unskillful or inexperienced driver is not to be excused from liability for injuries
inflicted because of his inexperience and unskillfulness," on the basis of testimony by a
witness who, "showed sufficient familiarity with the subject to qualify as an expert, and
"
. . . was competent to show within what distance a car could have been stopped. ...
Id. at -,
219 S.W. at 325. The Court concluded that since, "a car running 5 miles an
hour, with the machinery in fairly good working order, could be stopped in [this] distance" the accident which occurred resulted from his own unskillfulness in the operation
of the car; Id. Drummond v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 5611 (Cal.
Super., 1966), one of many cases involving the design of the Corvair, in which the court
concluded:
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uct is defectively designed.3 5 Further, even behavior on the part
of the plaintiff which has traditionally raised such affirmative
[T]hat . . (the deceased driver's, plaintiffs' son's) speed was not a prudent one and was too fast for the conditions which prevailed. There is no evidence that . . . (the deceased) had ever driven this road at night. He had no
real experience with the Corvair and its easy steering. The force he used in
turning the steering wheel so far to the left may have resulted from his experience in driving his 1956 Dodge which had no power steering.
Whatever the cause, a speed of 60 miles per hour was excessive for the
curves involved and the enormous steering to the left was excessive and without
justification. It was simply foolhardly [sic] . . . to have driven the Corvair at
night around the right-hand curve and into the left-hand curve at 60 miles per
hour without having had more knowledge of, and experience with the Corvair
beyond that gained from the few times he had driven the car for a few miles
each time. [emphasis added]
See also Tiger v. American Legion Post No. 43, 125 N.J. Super. 361, 311 A.2d 179 (1973)
in which the plaintiff who was injured in a hit-and-run accident while admittedly intoxicated and who was claiming that the American Legion Post, through its bartender, negligently served her alcoholic beverages while she was visibly intoxicated, was allowed to get
to the jury on the question of her contributory negligence. See also James and Dickinson,
supra note 21 at 774, citing Hersey, Emotional Factorsin Accidents, 15 PERSONNEL J. 59,
60 (1936) for the proposition that:
In all people there are cycles of exhilaration and depression. Although the
period of depression usually lasts for not more than twenty per cent of the time,
one investigator found that fifty per cent of industrial accidents happened while
the workers were depressed.
35. Sos, Liability of Engineer for Defective Design, 19 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 184, 186
(1970) suggests that the "protective legal structure around architects and engineers which
has been sufficient. . . in the past to shelter members of those two professions from any
extensive liability. . . was erected on an unfirm foundation and cracks are appearing in
the wall . .. " The case of Broyles v. Brown Engineering Co., Inc., 275 Ala. 35, 151 S.2d
767 (1963) is cited as distinguishing engineers from physicians, attorneys and architects
in that there are too many elements of judgment to be dealt with in those professions,
whereas the elements involved in an engineering problem are ascertainable to the point
that it is reasonable and just for the purchaser to expect a specific result. Sos points out
that the court is relying upon the concept that there is scientific certainty involved in the
work of the engineer, stating:
With the engineering ability demonstrated in the space program, perhaps
the courts and the public will demand a higher standard of performance from
the engineering profession. The demands may be such that a lack of negligence
will no longer suffice to shelter the profession. Id. at 187-88.
[A] substantial number of engineers, both licensed and unlicensed, are
employed by corporations. Although this group is not engaged in the construction of buildings, bridges, or highways, their work affects the public healthand
safety as much, if not more than their licensed colleagues in the consulting
engineering business. [emphasis added] Id. at 191.
Sos however, quotes a "prominent attorney" in the product design liability area as saying,
"'the corporate structure of marketing, manufacturing, and engineering often dictate
what the ultimate design will be, thereby removing authority and responsibility from the
design engineer'." Id. at 192. He suggests however that managers of engineering sections
of corporations "will soon tire of testifying in product liability cases concerned with faulty
designs which were substantially altered by the marketing or manufacturing functions."
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defenses as contributory negligence or assumption of risk," if it
is knowable by the manufacturer, cannot be viewed as an intervening event which breaks the chain of foreseeability. This analysis leads to the contention that even such behavior as drunken
driving-under traditional concepts a clear example of behavior
which would relieve the manufacturer of liability-is so clearly
within the circle of foreseeable risk that automobile manufacturers have an affirmative duty to use all reasonable resources avail37
able to them to eliminate or at least diminish the risk.
The practical consideration to which such an analysis gives
rise is how to expand the knowledge of the courts and attorneys
as to the existence and potential value of information which is
routinely collected by professionals in the behavioral and social
sciences. Every time a court states its holding in terms of the
foreseeability of the behavior of the plaintiff, it is, knowingly or
not, making use of psychological evidence in that it is saying that
human behavior follows a discernable and therefore predictable
Id. He proposes that if the engineer is going to be the individual called to account he must
have the accompanying authority and control over the product, "so that he can take steps
to stem the tide of consumer injury." Id. at 193. He concludes:
As the instruments and background knowledge of the engineering world
continue to develop, the unknown and uncontrollable factors involved in engi.
neering projects decrease proportionately. With this decrease, the courts should
increase the engineer's liability based upon the succees or failure of the engineering project, the fruits of the engineer's services. Id.
Cf. Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967) which held an architectural
firm liable for contractor's employees on the basis of the fact that it had the right to stop
the work and therefore a corresponding duty to effect such stoppage if an unsafe condition
was apparent or should have been apparent. The majority view seems to have been that
architects and engineers have the superior technical knowledge which requires that they
be legally responsible for their work.
36. See generally Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask, 60 IowA L. REv. 1 (1974),
for a full discussion of the appropriate role of these affirmative defenses. The crux of
Twerski's argument is that: "Where defendant's duty is such that he is required to obviate
dangers even to those who are fully aware of them, then the law would be self-defeating if
it should subsequently relieve a defendant from liability merely because a plaintiff has
reasonably and voluntarily encountered the very risk which defendant had no right to put
to him in the first instance."
37. If the reader is uncomfortable with the thought of allowing recovery for an individual whose own culpable behavior is at best so socially undesirable and at worst violative
of the criminal law, perhaps another more emotionally appealing illustration will make
the point. Until recently bottles and vials which contain medicines have not been thought
of as defective if they fulfilled their traditional function as containers. Certainly, the
manufacturer had fulfilled his responsibility when an adequate warning was placed on the
label, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962). However, in view
of the well known curiosity drive of young children and the great risk of harm if they were
inadvertantly to swallow such substances, despite the possible culpability of their parents
in leaving such substances within their reach, these containers are increasingly being
made with special tops which cannot be removed by children.
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pattern. Typically, the behavior referred to is so simple or so
obvious that it is not even recognized as evidence which needs to
be formally introduced. Thus, it has been said to be foreseeable
that people stand on chairs and that children will put foreign
objects in their mouth. As the activity becomes more complex
however; as it begins to involve more complex products; as the
scope of the interaction between product and consumer becomes
broader, the way people will behave in relation to the product is
no longer knowable on this "common sense" level. Yet, it is precisely these areas involving complex forms of human behavior,
such as driving, flying an airplane, operating a sophisticated
piece of machinery-areas in which the consumer actually becomes part of a total system intended to accomplish a specific
task-which present the courts with the greatest challenge. These
cases no longer represent the settlement of a dispute between two
individuals, they deal rather with some of the major social and
economic problems created by our technological society. Although products in this class are intended to enhance the enjoyment and efficiency of man, as a result of a design which does not
adequately take the capabilities and limitations of man into account, they often actually create a conflict between men and the
machines they operate; a conflict which has created, in terms of
the automobile, for example, a major foreseeable drain on our
human and financial resources. In these cases (although not limited to these), evidence based on competent scientific research
could be extremely helpful in developing a standard by which the
court or the jury could determine whether the use in question was
within the range of "normal" or typical behavior and therefore
one which the defendant should have anticipated and provided
for in his design. In the remaining portion of this comment, a
number of cases are examined. First, the nature of the evidence
that has typically been produced in products liability litigation
will be considered; and some tentative suggestions will be offered
regarding the type of evidence which would have been desirable.
This evidence will be looked at from the neutral point of view of
increasing the knowledge of the court as to the standards a product would have to comply with in order to be considered defect
free. Second, the impact of behavioral research on the manufacturer's affirmative duty to build in safeguards will be weighed. In
conclusion, some of the policy implications of introducing the
increased precision of a scientific evidence into court-made determinations of liability will be briefly discussed.
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II.

THE NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION: ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL

Traditionally, in a products liability action, part of the plaintiffs burden was to prove that the goods of which he complained
were unreasonably dangerous for their intended use3" either because they were negligently made or because the defendant was
strictly liable (in tort or on the basis of implied warranty) for a
defect which was in the product when it left his control. It is the
contention put forward in this article that the question of defectiveness cannot be adequately determined without first examining the question of whether the product was dangerous for that
use which the defendant was obliged for foresee and that this can
be determined only by evidence as to how the consumer actually
uses a particular product." A study of cases reveals however, that
both the element of negligence and the element of defect have
been typically regarded as subject to proof by inference and circumstantial evidence and, as the following two cases illustrate,
the shifting of emphasis from negligence to defectiveness has not
dramatically changed the standards of proof. Markel v. Spencer"
is illustrative of the nature of the proof which was required to
reach the jury in a negligence action:
38. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) articulated
the standard. But cf. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969)
in which the concept of intended use was systematically explored. The court framed the

issue before it as "whether the concept of 'intended use' includes foreseeable consequences
of unintentional misuse." Id. at 1068. Since apparently neither counsel nor the court had
found any Pennsylvania decisions on point, the court stated the basis of its analysis by
citing the rule of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) that
"the scope of the duty is coterminous with the foreseeability of risk." Id. at 1069. The court
then turned to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h which says in
part that, "'a product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling
and consumption

. . .'"

Id. at 1070. The defendant was held to be liable, apparently on

the ground that vehicular accidents are incidental to normal or intended uses of motor
vehicles on today's highways. See also Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th
Cir. 1968) in which the court declared: "[T]he 'intended use' construction urged by
General Motors is much too narrow and unrealistic." Id. at 502. Injuries resulting from
failure to use reasonable care in design "are readily foreseeable as an incident to the
normal and expected use of an automobile." Id. The court continued with the oft quoted
statement: "While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other,
a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in collisions
and injury-producing impacts." Id.
39. It could be argued (and the author is tempted to do so) that the same standard
is appropriate in a negligence action in that evidence as to how and under what conditions
a product will actually be used is necessary to determine the required standard of care
for the manufacturer.
40. 5 App. Div. 2d 400, 171 N.Y.S.2d 770 (4th Dept. 1958) afl'd without opinion, 5
N.Y.2d 958, 157 N.E.2d 713, 184 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1959).
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It was self-evident that the defect in the bolt must have been
caused by some act or omission in the process of manufacture
or inspection ...
The jury had the right to infer that a new car would not have
been turned out with a defective bolt if the required degree of
care had been exercised by the manufacturer. The manufacturer
was chargeable with knowledge that a defect in the braking
mechanism would jeopardize the life and bodily security of any
person who used the car. . . and the manufacturer was bound
to use care commensurate with the risk." [emphasis added]
Circumstantial proof may be sufficient to meet the burden of
proof on an issue like negligence even though the inference is
equivocal as to just what the party's specific acts or omissions
were. This is so whenever it appears sufficiently likely that defendants conduct included
some act or omission which a jury
2
could call negligent.
The plaintiff was not as successful in Jakubowski v. Minne3
sota Mining and Manufacturing,1
even though it was five years
later and the court focused on what is presumably the consumer
doctrine of defect rather than on negligence. The case is a good
illustration of the competing considerations before the court when
the plaintiff is forced to rely on circumstantial evidence and on
the inference that the product was defective because he himself
did nothing wrong. The plaintiff, a workman in a Ford plant, was
injured when an abrasive disc used for sanding automobiles broke
while in use and struck him a severe blow. The court acknowledged that: 4
It is common knowledge that tools can be damaged in the hands
of a novice. Even an expert carpenter will occasionally bend a
nail while driving it in and thus destroy its usefulness though it
was fit for the purpose intended when the carpenter picked it
up. And it is common knowledge that sandpaper intended for
rough sanding of wood will tear or break if applied ineptly to a
rough surface or if it is overused.
45
The court continued, however:

[Wie have here four possible causes of the break, viz: manufac41. 5 App. Div. 2d at 404, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 775.

42. 5 App. Div. 2d at 408, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 779, quoting 2 HARPER

AND JAMES, TORTS

§ 19.4, at 1072 (1956).
43. 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
44. Id. at 185, 199 A.2d at 830.
45. Id. at 186, 199 A.2d at 831.
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turing flaw, inadequate design, misuse, or overuse. The plaintiff
has introduced no evidence which indicates that one of these
causes is more probable than the others. In order to recover, he
must present evidence from which it is reasonable to infer that
more probably than not the cause of the break was one for which
the defendant is responsible.
The court thus held that "in the absence of evidence tending to
show that the product was not mishandled or used beyond its
reasonably expected life span after it left the manufacturer's
hands"4 it could not hold the manufacturer liable. In a strong
dissent, Justice Weintraub questioned the majority's insistence
that plaintiff was required to exclude the other possible causes for
the disintegration of the disc and the fact that he himself did not
misuse it. He reasoned that since there was nothing to suggest
that "improper or excessive use was realistically involved" 17 there
must have been a defect.
These cases and others like them illustrate the extremes to
which some courts are willing to go to infer what "must have
happened" on the basis of what can only be termed speculation;
particularly in the latter case, speculation as to the conduct of the
plaintiff in relation to the product which caused his injury. In the
Markel case, the defendant "must have been" negligent. In
Jakubowski, the same set of "facts" led the majority, on the basis
of the common knowledge that workmen make mistakes, to hold
that causation had not been established; whereas the dissent, not
relying on this "common knowledge", came to the opposite conclusion.
On the basis of the theory which is being suggested in this
46. Id.
47. Id. at 189, 199 A.2d at 833.
48. Cf. Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1965) in which a
battery manufactured by defendant exploded in plaintiff's hand. The defendant argued
that plaintiff had failed to prove that the battery was (1) negligently made; (2) defective
when sold; (3) harmful when used as intended; or (4) that any negligence or defect was
the proximate cause of injury. Relying extensively on Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) the MarathonBattery court
stated that it was "sufficient to establish a manufacturer's liability" [when a plaintiff is
injured] "as the result of a defect in design or manufacturre which made the machine
unsafe." 418 P.2d at 915. Ignoring the issue of causation, the court stated:
The primary issue involved was whether the battery exploded, and this matter
explicitly was submitted to and determined by the jury. We have held consistently that in civil cases the facts are provable by direct or circumstantial
evidence, or by both. And it is not required that the proof rise to that degree of
certainty which will support only one conclusion to the exclusion of all others.
418 P.2d at 917.
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paper, the "common knowledge" that even "expert" workmen
will handle a product unskillfully at a particular time and thus
take an injury to the workman out of the manufacturer's zone of
liability is completely without justification. In fact, it is precisely
because even "expert" craftsmen sometimes bend nails and break
discs and because these events are predictable and foreseeable
that the manufacturer should be liable, if there is evidence that
such events could be averted through proper care in manufacture
and design. Jakubowski would appear to have been an ideal case
for either the plaintiff or defendant to produce expert testimony
as to how workmen actually do perform the snagging operation
in which the plaintiff was injured. 9 There was testimony that
discs of the type involved in plaintiffs injury often broke in use,
presumably creating potential harm to others who performed the
same operation and that this could have been due to the mishandling of the discs.'" The only expert to testify was a manager of
Ford's Engineering Process Department, who testified that on the
basis of his experience with "this type of equipment. . . it is not
related to the tool that is driving the wheel (disc)"." His testi52
mony continued:
Any relationship is with the disc itself, rather than the machine.
Within my experience, there has been nothing that could contribute to a wheel breakdown or failure that could be attributed
to an outside source of the driven type machine like this.
The opinion goes on to state: "The trial court attempted to elicit
49. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1954) §200 Other Accidents and Injuries in
Negligence and Products Liability Cases cites five purposes for which such evidence may

be tendered, all of which might be appropriate for Jakubowski and similar cases:
1. To prove the existence of a particular physical condition, situation or defect.
2. To show that the plaintiff's injury was caused by the alleged defective or
dangerous condition or situation.
3. To show that the situation as of the time of the accident sued for was
dangerous.
4. To prove that the defendant knew of the danger, or ought in the exercise of
reasonable care to have learned of it.
5. When the defendant by pleading, opening statement, or by the testimony
of his witnesses has asserted that the injury sued for could not have been caused
by the defendant's conduct as alleged, then the plaintiff may show other similar
happenings to rebut the claim of impossibility.
50. The issue of overuse of the discs was also raised, but need not be of concern for
the limited purpose of this discussion, which is intended to be merely illustrative.
51. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing, 42 N.J. 177, 187, 199 A.2d
826, 831 (1964).
52. Id.
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some additional basis for this opinion but none was forthcoming
'53

An analysis of the specific tasks involved in the snagging
operation might have revealed a way in which the total system
(man - driving tool - sanding wheel) could have been redesigned,
keeping in mind that it is generally more efficacious to redesign
machinery than people. To use a purely hypothetical illustration,
if it had been found that in actual operation the job of snagging
involved using the disc at a certain angle or that the workmen
tended to apply pressure to a certain point and that this is when
the accidents occurred, perhaps the disc could have been redesigned for these specific demands of the task and the worker. On
the other hand, analysis of the job and the data on specific taskrelated mishaps might have revealed that there was no discernible pattern to the occurrence of accidents i.e., no significant relationship could be found between the task, the worker's performance and the breaking of the discs); that the breaking of sanding
discs was a pure chance occurrence which could neither be foreseen nor avoided. Under the theory being advanced in this article,
the manufacturer under these circumstances would avoid liability.54
Although the product involved required a far higher level of
training and skill, and the factual controversy was far more com5 was
plex, Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corporation1
similar to
Jakobowski in that it involved the question of whether possible
mishandling or lack of experience on the part of the user of the
product protects the manufacturer from liability. The actual determination which the court had to make in Prashker was
whether evidence of 38 fatal accidents involving the structural
failure of planes of similar design was properly excluded by the
trial court. In spite of an extensive record, there was no evidence
53. Id.
54. Cf. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) which
relied on a similar case decided a year earlier, Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d
70 (5th Cir. 1962). The issue was whether the defendant was liable for the cancerous death
of a smoker of its cigarettes. In Green, although smoking had been found to be the
proximate cause of death, the court found that defendant could not have known that users
of cigarettes would be in danger of contracting cancer prior to the time when it was first
discovered that Green had cancer. The Lartigue court, quoting from Green, stated that
the defendant "'had no opportunity to gain knowledge, or to form a judgment as to the
dangerous qualties of the product.'" 317 F.2d at 39. A manufacturer "'could not be held
liable as an absolute insurer against consequences of which no developed human skill and
foresight could afford knowledge.'" 317 F.2d at 38 (quoting from Green).
55. 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 910 (1958) (applying Delaware
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on the question of whether the plane known as the Bonanza had
been designed on the basis of adequate knowledge of the skills
and fallibilities of the pilots who would complete the system.
Although there was some evidence tending to point to defects in
the plane which would cause a pilot to lose control, the court
concluded that to hold the aircraft responsible when the accidents involved pilots unqualified to fly under instrument conditions "would be utterly to disregard the factor of human fallibility
known inevitably to occur in such circumstances . . . ."
Thus, again we see a court, as we did in Jakubowski, take
notice of the fact that people are fallible and then unfortunately
we see it using this "knowledge" as justifying the inference that
the planes were not defective. An analysis of the case leads to two
conclusions. First, that common knowledge, as has been pointed
out previously, is an inadequate method of acquiring valid knowledge about the complexities of the pilot-plant interaction. Secondly, even assuming that appropriate research and data collection techniques had revealed that pilots tended to lose control of
planes like the Bonanza under instrument flying conditions, this
information rather than relieving the defendant of liability should
have created a strong presumption that he was liable on the basis
that he had not taken adequate precautions in designing a plane
which could be piloted by "typical" pilots. 57 Obviously, when it
comes to a task like piloting, our society insures a minimum
standard of training and skill through its licensing procedures.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the norm established by means
56. Id. at 608-09. Note the fact that this case involved what the court would have us
believe, on the basis of inadequate evidence, were not one or two but 38 unqualified pilots
who had been involved in fatal plane crashes in similar planes. This is on its face incredible.
57. Cf. A. CHAPANIS, MAN-MACHINE ENGINEERING 1-3 (1965), which discusses another
plane disaster, which took place on June 30, 1956 and involved the mid-air collision of
two commercial airlines-a TWA Super-Constellation and a VAL DC-7-thus resulting
in 128 deaths. In this case there was no issue on the competence of the pilots. Both crews
were considered highly qualified on the basis of the standard criterion of number of flying
hours. They were known to be rested and in good physical condition. "Conclusive evidence" indicated that the "DC-7 had approached from above and behind at an angle 5 to
10 degrees from the Super-Constellation." The CAB report concluded that the probable
cause of the accident was that "the pilots did not see each other in time. . ." It is pointed
out by the author that aircraft design has made such progress that whereas once "the
intrepid aviator of fifty years ago soared into the air. . . and enjoyed a magnificent view
... [It was a rare aircraft that did not allow the pilot to see nine-tenths of the space
around him", in the following decades:
ITihe speed of aircraft increased, their contours became more streamlined, the
pilot was pushed back behind a console covered with dials, gauges, switches,
knobs and other gadgets. And the pilot became more remote from the space
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of appropriate research will be based on only those who have
already qualified beyond a specified level."
De Vito v. United Air Lines," was a case similar to Prashker
involving, however, the crash of a commercial airliner in which
forty-three people were killed. Among the facts presented, in a

record of thirty-three hundred pages, was the fact that the defendant, Douglas Aircraft Company, had conducted tests through
which it had been found that the test pilots were adversly affected
by carbon dioxide entering the cockpit. The d6ngerousness of the
situation had been further'confirmed by Aero-Medical Specialists
who had been retained by Douglas and who found that the procedures for ventilating the airplanes might be less than adequate.
Under these circumstances, where there was evidence that the
defendant had actual knowledge of research results on the effectiveness of the system, the court had little trouble in finding the
defendant liable on the basis of negligence. The fact that fortythree people died as a result cannot, however, be dismissed as a
factor in the decision.
A more recent case, Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp.,"'
finally confronted squarely the issue of whether the design of the
machine had adequately accounted for the human factor. When
through which he flew. The pilot of a Super-Constellation can see less than oneeighth of the space around him, the pilot of DC-7, scarcely 10 per cent. Id. at 4.
The case described is one in which the cause was apparently discernible. Most accidents
are not as thoroughly investigated as those in which, as in this one, a massive loss of life
is involved andtherefore the immediate cause never becomes known. Automobile accident
investigating and reporting is notoriously superficial and unreliable. "Improper driving"
has to a large extent become a catch-all on an accident report standing for behavior
ranging fromconscious risk-taking to a physiological inability to respond quickly enough
to an emergency situation. The lesson to be drawn is that rarely do we have the opportunity as we did in the case of the DC-7 and Super-Constellation to see how an accident can
result from designed in features of the machine, which so handicap the human part of the
system that the ultimate event appears to be the result of human error; But cf. North
American Aviation v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 914
(1958) which also involved the question of whether a pilot had had adequate experience
in the type of instrument flying required. It was held that while the true cause of the
accident would probably remain a mystery, there was substantial evidence that there was
a defect in the manufacture of the airplane for which the defendant was responsible.
58. Cf. Steele v. Rapp, 183 Kans. 371, 327 P.2d 1053 (1958) in which the plaintiff was
a trained and licensed beauty operator who was injured as a result of dropping a bottle
containing a "highly inflammable and explosive" chemical apparently known to be dangerous to people in the trade. The defendant argued that he was entitled to assume that
as a result of her knowledge and experience, the plaintiff would safely handle the product.
The dissent agreed, referring to the licensing requirement, that "such duty (to handle the
product safely) is imposed .. .by law." Id. at 391, 327 P.2d at 1068. The majority,
apparently unmoved by this argument, held the defendant liable.
59. 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y.) (1951).
60. 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971).
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the engine of an airborne helicopter stops, the helicopter will fall
to the ground unless the rotor blades are placed in auto rotation.
The plaintiff argued that the helicopter designed by defendant
was in defective condition because it did not allow the average
pilot to go into auto rotation in time to save his life." The court
accepted the premise. The remaining issue was whether there was
evidence to confirm the allegation that there was insufficient time
for the average pilot to go into autorotation. Evidence on pilot
response and reaction time seems clearly to have been called for.
One cannot tell from reading the appellate decision whether such
evidence was in fact introduced. It was held however, in what
would appear to be a breakthrough in design cases of products
already regulated by governmental standards, that although the
administrative criterion was met, this alone did not take the case
out of the hands of the jury. 2 The fact that such standards had
been complied with was simply one piece of evidence, not conclusive of the issue.
In Marshall v. Ford Motor Company, 3 defective design was
claimed because of the failure of the defendant to provide a lock
or catch on the folding back of a split front seat. During the
injury-causing collision, the plaintiff was restrained by his seat
belt and his body was compressed by the intensity of the impact
when the rear passenger hit the folding back of the front seat. The
defendant claimed that the injuries would not have occurred if
the rear seat passenger had been using the seat belt with which
the car was equipped. The plaintiff argued that the failure of rear
seat passengers to use seat belts was foreseeable and that the Ford
61. Cf. Gorman v. Sacramento County, 92 Cal. App. 656, 661-62, 268 P. 1083, 108586 (1928):
[lit is fair to assume, there being no evidence in the record to the contrary, that
when deceased met his death he was exercising due and proper care for the
protection of his person and the preservation of his life. This presumption is
sufficient to constitute prima facie evidence that the deceased at the time he
was drowned was free from contributory negligence.
Baltimore & P.R. Co. v. Landrigan, 191 U.S. 461 (1903) is cited:
We know of no more universal instinct than that of self-preservation, none that
so insistently urges to care against injury. It has its motives to exercise in the
fear of pain, maiming, and death. There are few presumptions based on human
feelings or experience, that have surer foundation.
62. Cf. Johnston v. Yolo County, 274 Cal. App. 2d 46, 79 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1969), involving the issue of whether the County was immune from a charge of having defectively
designed a road containing a dangerous curve and not posting a warning, held that the
trial court's instruction had been "misleading" because it told the jury that the County
was entitled as a matter of law to rely upon motorist's compliance with the basic speed
law as a sufficient safeguard against "such conditions."
63. 446 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1971).
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Company minimally had a responsibility to give warning of the
consequences on the nonuse. It is of interest that in this case it is
the defendant rather than the plaintiff who seeks help by appealing to the "common knowledge" of the court. The court in holding
that the manufacturer did not have a duty to warn, declared: "In
this day and age the function of seat belts is a matter of common
knowledge."" It did not apply the equally "common knowledge"
that automobile riders, especially rear seat passengers, simply do
not use the seat belts provided. The case uniquely illustrates the
futility of relying on common knowledge unless the purpose is
merely to rationalize a decision which has already been made.
This is particularly true when, as in this case, competent evidence is available as to attitudes and actual practices regarding
the use of seat belts. A study consisting of structured personal
interviews with a national probability sample of 1,500 licensed
drivers aged 16 to 64 years who own or operate automobiles that
are equipped with seat belts revealed that only 17% claimed, to
5
wear seat belts for short trips.
Another group of cases which cry out for some firm evidence
on what constitutes normal use, center around products used in
the home and for recreation. Thus, the class of people whose
behavior would be relevant becomes larger and broader: No
longer industrial employees or pilots, but farmers, who use tractors in excess of recommended speed; " homeowners who, in spite
of warning, forgetfully turn on faucets which run scaldingly hot
water; 7 people who smoke after anointing themselves with Ben64. Id.
65. Motivating Factors in the Use of Restraint Systems (Contract No. FH.11-7610
prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 1971) at 2.
66. Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Mobil Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 79 N.W.2d
688 (1956).
67. Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Cf. A. CHAPANIS,
MAN-MACHINE ENGINEERING

109-110 (1965), with respect to controls of common household

equipment, and at 116 for a discussion of an experiment reported in A. CHAPANIS AND L.
LIRDENBAUM, A REACTION TIME STUDY OF FOUR CONTROL-DIsPLAY LINKAGES (1959). It developed out of the fact that various gas and electric kitchen stoves have several different
linkages between the controls and the burners:
Subjects were tested to discover how quickly and how accurately they could
associate the control on the front panel with the burner on the top surface.
Fifteen different subjects (sixty in all) were tested on each stove, and each
subject was tested for eighty consecutive trials. When a light appeared near the
center of one of the burners, the subject had to respond as quickly as possible
by pushing the correct control. A. CHAPANIS, supra, at 117.
The results of this experiment were that there were no errors made with one model; 76
with a second; 116 with the third; and 129 with the fourth. "The average response times
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Gay;" fifteen year old boys who drive into thirty inch deep vinyl
swimming pools;"5 and women who exercise with "tummy flatteners."' The activities are clearly less standardized than those of
a snagging disc operator or even a pilot, but each presents a
question of whether the behavior of the plaintiff was within the
normal range of foreseeability; 7' in other words, was it the behavagree with the error data: the arrangement on which subjects made no errors gave the
shortest average response time." Id. The author says on the basis of this and other studies
cited in the chapter that: "It is clear that control-display arrangements have an important
effect on performance." Id. Although "it is difficult to devise a set of general rules to cover
all the possible kinds of control - display arrangements . . . . (n)onetheless, some rules
seem to be so general and dependable that they could be called principles." Id. As illustration, the first three of these principles are:
1. Displays and controls that are to be used in a fixed order should be
arranged in sequence (a) from left to right, (b) from top to bottom, or (c) in rows
from top to bottom, and from left to right within the rows.
2. When a number of displays and controls are each associated with a
group of similar components, the arrangement of the controls and displays
should correspond with the arrangement of the components. (For example, in a
four-engine aircraft, the four throttle controls, RPM indicators, and mixture
controls, should be arranged from left to right in the same order as the engines
themselves.)
3. Controls associated with specific displays should be located so that the
operator's hand does not prevent him from seeing the display. When a number
of associated controls and displays appear on a panel, (a) put each control
directly below its corresponding display or (b) group all the displays above and
all the controls below, but arrange the controls and the displays in exactly the
same order. Id. at 117-18.
To reiterate a point made throughout this comment, the existence of research data such
as the above should create a presumption of liability in a case in which a plaintiff has
been injured by a product in which the arrangement of control-displays violated these
principles.
68. Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
69. Colosimo v. May Department Store Co., 325 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
70. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
855 (1957).
71. Cf. Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684
(1967). Plaintiff was injured when a chip from the bevelled edge of the face of the claw
hammer broke off and struck him in the eye. Defendant alleged that he had used the
hammer in a "violent, unreasonable manner in excess of the purpose for which manufactured and that such use brought about the injury. . ." Id. at 320, 229 N.E.2d at 686. The
court, citing HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW oF ToRrs, §28.4, stated:
[T]he manufacturer or seller must take reasonable precautions in the light of
dangerous propensities that are, or should be known. What, if any, precautions
are required, is a question that will vary with the circumstances and will depend
upon the balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm, if it
happens, against the burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid
the harm. Id. at 327, 229 N.E.2d at 689.
The case is of particular interest in that the plaintiff introduced the testimony of five
witnesses as to the "custom of farmers within the community to use claw hammers, not
" as the plaintiff was
only for carpentry work, but . . . for work upon machinery ....
doing when he was injured. Id. at 330, 229 N.E.2d at 691.
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ior of an average person of that class or group. 2 Although the
courts involved have decided each of the above cases on the basis
of a common knowledge approach without the guidance of experts, some of the behaviors involved clearly lend themselves to
systematic study. For example, in terms of mental processes, how
and why people forget; in terms of physical behavior, how they
use a rubber exercise rope. In the latter case the rope should have
been thoroughly tested to determine whether there were any
problems (defects) in design which would not appear before actual normal use. Although, the plaintiff in the case made references to the possibility of safeguards, the court could not deal
with this issue because as it stated: "plaintiff tendered no issue
of fact on this topic . . . she should have posed a genuine issue
72. Such a standard has traditionally been applied to young children for whose curiosity the courts typically make allowances. Although knowledge of children's early developmental behavior is a special concern of psychologists, much of it is also in the realm of
common knowledge. Thus, it has been held that the fact that a five year old girl might
spray her clothing as well as her hair with large quantities of hair spray because she liked
the smell and then accidently set herself on fire, although an abnormal use, was not
unforeseeable, see Hardman v. Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill. App. 2d 42, 198
N.E.2d 681 (1964). Accord, Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N.Y.S. 496
(1930), aff'd 255 N.Y. 624, 175 N.E. 341 (1931) (a flame from a toy revolver ignited a Santa
Claus costume in which infant plaintiff was dressed); Travell v. Bannerman, 174 N.Y. 47,
66 N.E. 583 (1903) (defendant stored gun-powder in an unfenced lot, "which he knew"
plaintiff and other small boys used as a playground); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp.
373 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (jacket made for a young child was not treated with flame retardant
substances which would have added only a few cents to the cost). The court stated:
To an ever-increasing extent in this day of synthetic living, the population
is dependent on mass producers for its wearing apparel . .

.

.Greater care and

integrity is required by society from sellers, as well as increased caution for the
safety and well-being of all users, especially the child consumer. 275 F. Supp.
at 379.
The defendant argued that the charge of the lower court was "imposing on the seller of
clothing for children the duty that the parents obviously have to undertake." Id. at 382.
In upholding the lower court instructions, the court said:
The instructions emphasized that if the jury found that conduct of such children
playing with fire was so extraordinary or abnormal, they might find that...
[defendant] could not have anticipated or have foreseen the harm, and they
should exonerate .. .[defendant] from liability; but if they found such conduct on the part of young children could reasonably have been foreseen. . . and
such conduct was not abnormal or extraordinary, they might find . ..
[defendant] liable .. .foreseeability is a standard to determine fault, but in
our opinion it is also an important factor in determining the applicability of
§402A. Id. at 383.
Cf. Dewar v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 49 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1944), an early case in which
the question of whether it was foreseeable that a small child might reach and handle the
exposed parts of a washing machine was treated as a matter of fact to be determined by
the jury. Contra, Moran v. Williams, 313 A.2d 527 (Md. Ct. App. 1974) (two teenage girls
attempted to scent a burning candle by pouring Tigress Cologne on the candle) held that
in the absence of evidence which would tend to show that the cologne manufacturer
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of material fact as to the reasonableness and feasibility of a safeguard if she wished to make that contention."7
IX.

THE IMPACT OF RESEARCH ON THE MANUFACTURER'S AFFIRMA-

TIVE DUTY

What is feasible in terms of safeguards in relation to a particular product is to a large extent related to the commitment to
systematic testing and research in the field. Even under the negligence standard, the test of reasonableness in terms of providing
for the safe use of a product, varied greatly and produced widely
discrepant results. Reasonable care could mean such rigorous
testing and inspection that it is in effect a contractual assurance
that no defective units shall pass. On the other hand, reasonableness may be so loosely defined as to excuse almost any lack of
care.74
foresaw or should have foreseen such use there was a failure, as a matter of law, to
establish any duty on the part of the manufacturer. Appellants had sought reversal by
proposing that the question of what constitutes an intended or ordinary use is "more
properly answered against a backdrop of community experience, rather than by the pronouncements of the manufacturer and therefore, a question of fact to be decided by the
jury." Id. at 530; Lawson v. Benjamin Ansehl Co., 180 S.W.2d 751 (Mo. App. 1944)
(youngster of five splashed inflammable fingernail polish over his clothes and then set fire
to himself); Boyd v. Frenchee Chem. Corp., 37 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1941) (10 month
old child drank poisonous fabric cleaner). In both of above cases it was held as a matter
of law that these uses were unforeseeable.
The foreseeability of harm from fire has been an issue in cases other than those
involving children. A leading case is Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette, 215 F.2d 102 (2nd Cir.
1954), in which Judge Frank's strong dissent was expressed in terms of foreseeability. On
the basis of the fact that there are approximately a million household fires a year, he felt
that the intervening fire which caused the injuries complained of could not be regarded
as extraordinary or unforeseeable.
Another area in which recent decisions have held the manufacturer to be responsible
for having adequate knowledge of the consumer is that of allergic reactions to a product.
Noel, Manufacturer'sNegligence of Design orDirectionsfor Use of a Product,71 YALE L.J.
816, 865 (1962) explains that: "Ordinarily this duty is fulfilled by a warning or by instructions for making of tests. . . however. . . where a substantial number of people are likely
to suffer allergic reactions of a serious character from an ingredient in a product, there
might be a duty to eliminate, where feasible, the offending ingredient." See, e.g., Wright
v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2nd Cir. 1957 ) (applying New York law); Braun v.
Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958) involving the manufacture and distribution
of hair dye, in which the defendant was held to "the skill of an expert in that [his]
particular business, 'to an expert's knowledge of the arts, materials and processes' and is
bound to keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning his
field and, of course, is deemed to possess whatever knowledge is thereby imparted." 312
S.W.2d at 763.
73. Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 855 (1957).
74. Reusch v. Ford Motor Co., 196 Wash. 213, 82 P.2d 556 (1938) held that it was
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When the issue is design defect as it is defined in this paper
(i.e. a product is defective if it has not been designed to fit the
foreseeable average consumer) the issue becomes the extent of the
manufacturer's affirmative responsibility to build in and to develop additional safeguards. In Witt v. Chrysler Corp.," a negligence action, the trial courts' instructions, which were upheld on
appeal, were: "The fact that it is not customary to employ certain
testing and inspection will not excuse a manufacturer for its failure to provide them, if common prudence requires their use in a
particular case."7 Additionally, a factor which has been held to
be of special significance with reference to the amount of testing
required is the gravity of the harm threatened.
In Bartkewich v. Billinger77 the court agreed with plaintiff's
contention that the lack of a proper safety device could constitute
a defective design and subject the manufacturer to liability under
Section 402A of the Restatement. It limited this doctrine however, only to situations in which the absence of such a device
caused an injury "of the type that could be expected from the
normal use of the product. 71 8 Thus, the defendant was relieved

of liability for not installing a guard rail because the plaintiff had
assumed an abnormal, unanticipated work position when he
reached into the glass breaking machine and voluntarily assumed
so obvious a risk. The court stated: "Appellant [defendant] was
entitled to believe that the machine would be used in its usual
manner, and need not be an insurer for the extra-ordinary risks
an operator might choose to take."79
Only three months later however, in the case of Greco v.
Bucciconi EngineeringCompany,80 under similar facts the defendant was found to be liable. Although the court found that the
plaintiff had voluntarily placed his hand under a steel-piler while
it was in operation (causing it to unexpectedly release and crush
his hand) it distinguished the facts from those in Bartkewich on
the grounds that there was evidence that the manufacturer knew
not negligent to design a truck in such a way that gasoline leaked from both the intake
and an electric gauge connection with the gasoline tank creating a great hazard from fire.
75. 15 Mich. App. 576, 167 N.W.2d 100 (1969).

76. Id. at 582, 167 N.W. at 103. Cf. Texas & P. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 469, 470
(1903) in which Justice Holmes said, "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought

to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence,
whether it usually is complied with or not."
77.
78.
79.
80.

432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
Id. at 354, 247 A.2d at 605.
Id. at 356, 247 A.2d at 606.
407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
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that employees would have to reach under the piler in order to
properly perform their job. Thus, the court concluded that the
injury resulted from the normal use of the product. The decision
seems to disregard voluntary misuse or assumption of risk as a
defense if the defendant had knowledge of the use. The only good
defense under the court's ruling would be that the plaintiff had
voluntarily made some unreasonable or abnormal use of the product. In effect, the court had imposed a foreseeability test as to
whether or not the seller should have anticipated such use and
therefore guarded against it."1
The distinction the court made between the facts in
Bartkewich and Greco would have appeared less spurious had the
decision in Greco been based on concrete behavioral evidence as
to how the typical operator of a steel-piler performs his tasks, i.e.,
standardized observation and experimentation on the nature of
the entire work situation and its potential hazards. Similarly in
Bartkewich, whether the plaintiff did assume an abnormal, unanticipated work position is a question which calls for competent
evidence on how other workers perform at the same machine.
Such evidence might in fact have borne out the verdict. It is
indeed possible that the plaintiff did something which was so far
outside the range of the normal behavior of similarly situated
workers that there was no way for the defendant to have anticipated and guarded against it. It is in this way that the traditional
affirmative defense of obviousness of the danger perhaps has
meaning; the test of obviousness would be that a significant majority of similarly situated people did not engage in the behavior
which injured the plaintiff, presumably because the risk was obvious and their natural instincts for self-preservation were operating. 2 Under these circumstances the manufacturer would be relieved of liability. Such a rule, however, would be phrased in
terms of the foreseeability of the behavior of a class of consumers,
81. Cf. Wheeler v. Standard Tool and Manufacturing Co., 359 F. Supp. 298
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), holding that the absence of a guard at the needle-inserting station of a
machine designed to assemble hypodermic syringes was a defect which was unreasonably
dangerous to the user. The court relied on the testimony of defendant's own witness who
testified that he had strongly urged the defendant to use such guards; accord, Walker v.
Trico Manufacturing Co., 487 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1973) in which the plaintiff had actually
extracted an admission from the defendant's president that he had foreseen the possibility
of an accident resulting from the absence of a cover to the switch which activated the
defendant's machine. In both of the above cases, the defenses of misuse of the product
and assumption of risk were rejected.
82. See Baltimore & P.R.R. v. Landrigan, 191 U.S. 461, 474 (1903).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1974

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1974], Art. 17
Hofstra
Law Review
[Vol. 2, 1974]

rather than in terms of obviousness of the danger or assumption
of risk. The Bartkewich court stated: "The whole point is that
there was no need for appellee [the defendant] to be at the spot
where the jam occurred to prevent damage to the machine; the
switch was easily accessible and would have provided a safe and
efficient means of stopping it."83 As has been suggested by the
entire thrust of this paper, such statements, since they are the key
to the ultimate decision in a products liability case, must be
submitted to available methods of proof.
A remaining question, the answer to which would seem to be
implied by the preceding discussion, is whether a manufacturer
has an affirmative duty to provide his equipment with fail-safe
devices which would give prospective users an absolute guarantee
of safety, even against their own inadvertence. Moren v. Samuel
M. Langston Co.84 dealt with this issue in the context of a suit for
damages arising out of injuries which the plaintiff sustained in
connection with the use of a printer-slotter machine used in the
manufacture of paper cartons and shipping containers. Plaintiff's
expert, whose testimony had been disqualified at the trial level,
was prepared to testify that there were two basic categories of
safety device for machines of this type; the first, designed to
prevent individuals from entering into or near the moving parts;
the second, an electronic eye which would stop the machinery. He
would have further testified that there was an electronic eye
which would not interfere with the operation of the machine or
in the production of the product, which could have been attached
to the entrance of the areaway so that if any person either
deliberately or accidently passed the machine would have automatically stopped. The witness himself had disseminated information about such a device by means of bulletins and industry
newsletters. The defendant objected to this line of testimony not
only on the basis of the witness' qualifications, but also on the
ground that no other manufacturer of solid printer-slotters had
developed or was using such an innovation and that there was no
proof that the defendant had received notice and thus had knowledge of the development of such an electronic eye. In this argument, the defendant relied on two previous Illinois cases 85 which
had held that evidence of the fact that there were safety devices
83. Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 355, 247 A.2d 603, 606 (1968).
84. 96 Il. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968).
85. Day v. Barber-Colman Co., 10 Il1. App. 2d 494, 135 N.E.2d 231 (1956); Watts v.
Bacon & Van Buskirk, 18 Il.2d 226, 163 N.E.2d 425 (1960).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss2/17

26

Block:
of Behavioral
Research in Products Liability Litigation
Research
Behavioral
UseTheofUse

available other than that which the defendant was using was
immaterial where, "it is not in itself negligence to supply a certain type of machine though other types of machines might conceivably be safer." 86 The Moren court distinguished both of these
previous cases on the ground that neither opinion gave any indication that evidence had been offered "as to standards in the
industry, use of other materials or devices, or that the defendants
knew or should have known of the existing state of the art in the
industries in which the defendants operated." 87 In holding that
the excluded evidence should have been admitted, in that it
would have aided the jury in deciding "what was feasible and
what the defendant knew or should have known""8 the court
stated:
A manufacturer is held to the degree of knowledge and skill of
experts.

.

.This standard imposes upon the manufacturer the

duty of an expert to keep abreast and informed of the developments in his field including safety devices and equipment used
in his industry with the type of products he manufacturers. 9
"[A] custom either to take or to omit a precaution is generally admissible as bearing on what is proper conduct under the
circumstances, but is not conclusive." 90 Custom is relevant in
determining the standard of care because it illustrates what is
feasible, it suggests a body of knowledge of which the defendant
should be aware. . . .1 But custom should never be conclusive.
As Judge Learned Hand said, . . . "[In most cases reasonable

prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say
what is required ....,,12
The preceding review of cases has focused on the type of
evidence which has been or should have been offered in products
liability litigation. It has dealt with cases in which there appeared
to be an evidentiary gap and suggested how this might have been
App. 2d 133, 144, 237 N.E.2d 759, 764.
86. 96 Ill.
87. Id. at 145, 237 N.E.2d at 765.
88. Id. at 146, 237 N.E.2d at 766.
89. Id. at 145, 237 N.E.2d at 765.
90. Id., citing 2 HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §17.3, at 977-78 (1956).
91. Id., citing generally Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147
(1942); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§459, 461 (3d ed.).
92. Id. at 145-46, 237 N.E.2d at 765-66, citing The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d
Cir. 1932).
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filled by the testimony of behavioral scientists on the dynamics
of the man-machine system as it relates to what the defendantmanufacturer should have anticipated and therefore incorporated
into the design of his product. Obviously such intensive research
and evaluation as has been suggested is feasible and should fill
more than a mere evidentiary need. Hopefully it will lead to safer
products before serious injuries and costly, time-consuming litigation is required. A few courts, apparently heeding such words
as those of Judge Learned Hand, cited in the Moren"3 decision,
have begun to move towards articulating standards on the basis
of foreseeability of risk combined with the availability of the
necessary technology.
If other courts were to adopt the holding of Moren, is the day
not too distant when a jury would find an automobile manufacturer liable to parties injured as a result of an accident involving
a drunken driver? The fact that people drive after they have been
drinking (or are otherwise incapable of responding adequately to
the driving task) and that alcohol "has been clearly identified as
the single most important human factor underlying unsafe actions by drivers . . . in severe and fatal crashes" 4 is both a matter of common knowledge and one that has been verified in many
scientific studies.15 Additionally, technology is available and
known within the field and without (it has been widely discussed
in the popular media)"1 which would prevent people impaired by
93. 96 Ill. App. 2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968).
94. D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, supra note 24 at 74 citing, e.g., Alcohol and Highway
Safety Report of the Secretary of Transportation (1968): "iThe use of alcohol by drivers
and pedestrians leads to some 25,000 deaths and a total of at least 800,000 crashes in the
United States each year."
95. E.g., D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, supra note 24 at 76, citing Barmack & Payne, Injury.
producing private motor vehicle accidents among airmen: Psychological models of
accident-generatingprocesses, 52 J. OF PSYCH. 3 (1961), Selzer, Alcoholism, medical ill.
ness, and stress in 96 drivers causing fatal accidents, 14 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 1 (1969);
Waller, Chronic medical conditions and traffic safety: A review of California experience,
273 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1413 (1965); cf. THE STATE OF THE ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY, A
CRITICAL REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON FACTORS AFFECTING

TRAFFIC SAFETY (Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the Automobile Manufacturers Assoc., Inc.
1966) 28: "Excessive drinking has been clearly demonstrated to be associated with a large
share, perhaps over half, of the motor vehicle fatalities in the United States urban areas
96. The type of advertising which lauds the achievements of science and industry and
what has been done to enhance the enjoyment of living for the average American, typically
publicizes such advances as the alcohol interlock system and the possibility of embedding
tiny computers into the wheels of automobiles which would detect and prevent skidding
thus avoiding a major cause of serious accidents, leaving the typical American to wonder
when he will benefit from this progress.
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alcohol, drugs, or emotional distress from driving. The present
automobile key would be replaced with a device which would
detect impairment by measuring performance on psychophysical
tasks."
Whether such liability will ever be imposed on an automobile
manufacturer or whether such decisions as Moren or Larsen v.
General Motors Corporation', which held the defendant liable for
injuries "incident to the normal expected use of an automobile"9 9
will be more widely adopted is in fact not so much a matter of
legal reasoning or evidence as it is a matter of social policy. Foreseeability alone has never created a duty. Under traditional negligence concepts, a legal duty is established only when the law
responds to a societal decision that the foreseeable risks in a
situation are of such concern to society that they outweigh the
possible burdens of precaution imposed on the potential defendant. Strict liability cases seem to have carried over this language. It has been suggested in this paper that the concept of
defect itself can only be defined in terms of foreseeable use, i.e.,
when the risk is foreseeable and means are available by which the
manufacturer can correct for that risk the product is presumed
to be defective in design. The degree of acceptance of such a
theory; the degree to which the consumer will have the right,
enforceable in a court of law, to expect the products he purchases
to incorporate the benefits of scientific and technological advances which will balance his own fallibilities; the degree to
which manufacturers will not be permitted to define the scope of
their own responsibility, are questions which will be affected by
policy developing outside, as well as inside the courtroom.,"

IV.

THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

A primary policy question and one that cannot be avoided in
a discussion dealing with the establishing of realistic rules and
standards for courts to determine liability in cases involving
products or other civil liability, is whether the courts will take the
97. See J. TENNANT & R. THOMPSON, A CRITICAL TRACKING TASK AS AN ALCOHOL INTER(Society of Automotive Engineers 730095); E. McDOWELL & G. SMITH, JR.,
AN INVESTIGATION OF SERIAL CHOICE REACTION TIME AS THE BASIs FOR AN ALCOHOL INTERLOCK.
98. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
99. Id. at 502.
100. Cf. Noel, Defective Products:Abnormal Use, ContributoryNegligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 94 (1972) as to the kind of conduct by the plaintiff
that should defeat recovery, "a court's choice of policy factors as a basis of strict liability
may affect considerably its final decision."
LOCK SYSTEM
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responsibility at all or whether their decisions will simply ratify
the existing distribution of legal rights and responsibilities.
Typically, the justification of courts which take the latter route
is that they are not legislative bodies and thus should not perform
what they choose to appoint as legislative functions. An illustrative case is Schemel v. General Motors Corporation,'"'in which
the plaintiff whose automobile was struck in the rear by one being
driven at 115 miles per hour, alleged that the defendant was
under a duty to refrain from manufacturing cars with a capacity
for being operated at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour. The
court's rely was, "if regulation in this area is to come-and we
do not say it should not-it should come in the form of an act
which would apply a uniform national standard to a highly centralized national industry, and not be hammered out, higgledypiggledy, on a case to case basis with all of the disparity which
would inevitably result."""O
Other courts, such as the one which handed down the decision in Larsen v. General Motors Corporation,'3 specifically rejected this view. The court said that where a manufacturer's negligence in design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed on
the user of its products, the manufacturer should be liable for
injury caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in design.
The court specifically rejected the contention of the defense that
the design of the Corvair was sufficient under the design standards established by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1966, on the grounds that the statute was intended
to be supplementary of and in addition to the common law of
negligence and products liability and was not intended to create
an exemption from common law liability.
It is the belief of many commentators that the judicial process can be an effective instrument in obtaining safer products' 4
and in shifting the cost of accidents due to unsafe design.' °' Further, the fact that the legislature may act in the future does not
101. 261 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Ind. 1966).
102. Id. at 136.
103. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
104. E.g., Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society II, 37 CoLuM. L. REV. 341,
407-08 (1937) comments on the fact that Coca-Cola's new bottling equipment and system
of inspection make the reappearance of the well-known mouse highly unlikely.
105. Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the JudicialProcess, 55 CALIF. L. REV.
645 (1967).
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condone a court's refusal to mete out justice in the present. As
one commentator has stated:" 6
This attitude [that the person wronged must await for action
by the legislature upon the part of the courts] is evasive of the
judicial responsibility which the common law implicitly imposes
upon the judge to make the law serve the ends and needs of
justice in a changing world. It has been the boast of the common
law that it possesses the flexibility to accomplish this end.
Concomitant with the responsibility of courts not to evade
their judicial function is the responsibility to perform this function in an atmosphere grounded in reality. Laws, whether
statutory cr court-made, which do not adequately reflect reality
have distorting consequences. In terms of the thesis of this paper,
for example, misidentifying the causes of accidents by failing to
take notice of existing competent, reliable evidence, relevant to
the ultimate question of who ought to bear the financial burden
of the injury leads to: (1) misallocation of resources available for
accident prevention; (2) miscalculation for actuarial purposes of
the factors which predict accidents, i.e., the factors which account for the variance; (3) inappropriate use of criminal sanctions
and educational campaigns," 7 which as their ineffectiveness becomes generally known, decrease even further in efficacy since
they then lose even their prima facie validity.
106. C. GILLAMi, supra note 7, at 92 n.84 (1960) citingFeezer, Manufacturer'sLiability
for Injuries Caused by His Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REv. 1, 18-19,
n.45 (1938).
107. See generally, D. KLEIN & J. WALLER, supra note 24, at 209-10:
A very substantial proportion of current countermeasures focuses on changing the behavior of the driver, apparently on the assumption that, since the
driver is recognized, both in law and in public opinion, as being primarily
responsible, countermeasures ought to be concentrated on him. Both the assumption and the policies based upon it, however, are open to serious question
..... [C]onsiderations of cost-benefit would dictate an emphasis on the most
effective means of loss-reduction rather than a choice based on the faulty syllogism that since the driver is responsible for crashes.
his behavior will reduce
the number of crashes.
See also CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 303-07
(1970), which points out that most drunken and careless drivers are caught only if they
have an accident, and we don't know how many they may cause without themselves being
involved. Thus:
Where conduct can be defined as undesirable with sufficient precision the best
way to make those who engage in it pay . . . is to assess them directly and
individually - through non-insurable fines if they can be caught regardless of
accidents ....
The burden whether called fine, tax or insurance, would depend
on the general wrong-doing or undesirability of the activity, not on the fortuity
of an accident occurring to the particular parties.
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What then is the appropriate role of the court itself in fashioning standards for the type of evidence necessary to adequately
resolve the complex issues in products litigation arising in our
highly technical and scientific society?"0 8 If the necessary "hard",
research-based evidence is not forthcoming from the opposing
parties, might it not be appropriate for courts to take judicial
notice of the fact that in the years since the end of World War II,
research and data on human behavioral propensities in every
conceivable situation-from bedroom to schoolroom to factory to
highway-have been studied by thousands of investigators spending millions of primarily tax collected dollars.
The Michigan court said in 1872:1o9
The laws of nature and of the human mind, at least such of them
as are obvious to the common apprehension of mankind, as well
as the more obvious dictates of common sense and principles of
human action. . . constitute a part of the laws of the land, and
may, and must be assumed by the court without being found by
a jury ....
The court spoke before what is commonly thought of as the
birth of experimental psychology-the opening of the first experimental laboratory in Germany by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879.
What was once thought of as knowable only through the "common apprehension of mankind" is today knowable or at least
open to systematic investigation by the methods of science;
"common sense" has become suspect and rightly so, for the term
has too often been used to cover up after-the-fact rationalization
of pre-conceived ideas. Nevertheless, although our methods of
acquiring knowledge about the "human mind" have developed
and changed, what the court said then is equally apt today. The
courts more than ever need to take notice of the principles of
human knowledge as a guidepost to resolving twentieth and
twenty-first century problems.
108. J. Maguire, J. Weinstein, J. Chadbourn I J. Mansfield, Cases and Materials on
Evidence 43 (1965) suggest that the scope and nature of judicial proof may depend upon
what the court conceives its role to be in settling disputes and laying down guidelines for
the future, citing State Commission for Human Rights v. Farrell, 43 Misc. 2d 958, 960,
252 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652 (Sup. Ct. 1964) in which the court declared:
The court approaches this matter not simply as litigation between private
parties, but rather views the instant proceedings as raising vital matters filled
with greatest public concern. The issue herein ....

cannot be approached

strictly within the conventional confies of an adversary proceeding ....
groups
throughout the country are searching for guidelines in the handling of this
volatile problem.
109. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274 (1872).
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CONCLUSION

This article started with the proposition that the concept of
defect which is the essential element in products liability litigation under a strict liability standard can only be defined in terms
of the foreseeable behavior of the consumer. Whenever a court
frames its holding in terms of the foreseeability of the plaintiff's
use or misuse of a product, it is taking judicial notice of
psychological evidence. Typically, the behaviors of which courts
have taken notice were those that could be anticipated on the
basis of common sense or common knowledge alone. As products
and the behavior called forth by them become more complex
however, more reliable scientific evidence is required to establish
whether a plaintiff's behavior was within the normal anticipated
range of behavior of consumers of that product.
It has been contended that a manufacturer has an affirmative duty to use available research and data dealing with potential consumers of his product even to the extent of building in
safeguards which would protect the potential user against his own
inadvertence, misuse or misbehavior. Failure to do so should lead
to a presumption that the product is defective. The duty referred
to arises as a result of the foreseeability of human behavior (including human fallibilities) and the fact that scientific advances
in technology have made such increased consumer protection
possible.
The cases which were reviewed were selected because they
focused on the evidentiary problems raised by the theoretical
discussion. Each was chosen to illustrate how evidence based on
behavioral research could have increased the reliability of the
decision making process in terms of helping the court to determine legal standards, as well as in terms of giving juries a fuller
and more precise factual picture. Examples were given of the
types of evidence that appeared to be needed in specific cases
e.g., evidence relating to job analyses in cases involving industrial
accidents with machines; evidence concerning studies of pilot
performance, reaction time, and ability to respond to emergencies; evidence of the results of experiments dealing with the use
of household products. Products liability cases abound with
expert testimony by engineers, metallurgists etc. as to the capacity of a particular product to withstand stresses and strains; yet
rarely if ever do we find comparable evidence as to the stress
tolerance of the human part of what has been termed the manmachine system. Thus, the proposition was advanced that as
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products and the behavior they demand become increasingly
complex the manufacturer has a concomitant responsibility to
design products with a built-in allowance for human limitations.
Therefore, the review of cases ended with one focusing on the type
of evidence needed to sustain a holding that the manufacturer
had a duty to install safety devices which would actually insure
people against themselves through such devices as electronic eyes
which automatically stop machines and alcohol interlock systems
which prevent incapacitated people from starting cars.
The problem of accidents however, can no longer be isolated
in the context of a dispute between two individuals, with the
court determining which one was at fault. Clearly, the loss of
human and financial resources suffered yearly in this country as
a result of accidents-in the home, in industry, on the highways-demands a societal response and it is against this background that the case law will be hammered out.
Elizabeth Block
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